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1. Introduction 
How to evaluate the U.S. military administration is one of the most 
controversial themes in modern Korean history. The narrower topic of 
how to evaluate the health and medical services under the U.S. military 
administration also provides contentious issues. There have been several 
attempts to investigate the healthcare under the U.S. military administration 
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as a movement of criticism and self-reflection on the fact that research on 
modern medical history in Korea thus far has been excessively focused on 
the opening port era and the Japanese colonial period. Evaluation of the 
healthcare services under the U.S. military administration is largely divided 
into two opposing opinions. 
One school looks at the military administration’s medical system rather 
negatively, arguing that the medical system centered on public healthcare 
during the Japanese colonial period was transformed to the American private 
healthcare system during this period under the U.S. military administration 
(Shin, 2000: 231). On the other hand, there are several positive viewpoints 
arguing that the health and medical system, which was controlled and 
functioned within a frame of police works during the Japanese colonial 
period, could eventually settle as an independent field during the U.S. 
military administration (Kim, 2011: 34). They regard the period as the one 
in which the public health system was able to be established based on 
a new concept. Despite such contradicting evaluations, they agree that 
the framework of the current Korean healthcare system was fundamentally 
built during the U.S. military administration. 
The several studies that have been done on the medical system under 
the U.S. military administration thus far have mostly focused on the health 
and medical system and relevant policies along with leading figures during 
that period (Shin & Seo, 2013: 196-206). Regulations and policies deserve 
research priority in that they provide the most fundamental framework for 
a certain field’s activities. However, the fact that a certain rule existed and 
whether it actually functioned well are two completely different matters. It 
is difficult to evaluate the actual situation only depending on the existence 
of a certain rule. Hence, it is necessary to show how a given problem 
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was actually solved by the existing regulation and organization or how 
they failed to do so, in order to clearly understand the actual situation 
surrounding the U.S. military administration’s health and medical services. 
Accumulating the cases on the success and failure of such problem solving 
will enable us to decide whether the regulation and organization actually 
functioned effectively. So far, very little has been done concerning the 
control of a specific health problem under the U.S. military administration, 
and this is indeed what this paper attempts to address. This paper attempts 
to investigate the anti-malaria activities initiated by the U.S. military. 
Here, a question might emerge regarding why malaria was chosen 
among a number of infectious diseases in this paper. One of the answers 
to this question is that it was the most widely spread disease at the time 
and hence the most problematic disease for army forces in battlefields. In 
fact, the greatest threat to the U.S. military in Japan and the Pacific region 
during the World War II was not the Japanese army but malaria. Hence, 
the U.S. military labored to prevent and control malaria throughout the 
war and, as a result, it accumulated a substantial amount of experience and 
knowledge on it. These experiences were extremely helpful in controlling 
malaria in the U.S. military’s occupied territories such as Japan and Korea 
after the end of the war. Hence, the malaria case provides examples where 
the experience and knowledge accumulated during the war helped to 
solve subsequent health problems in the occupied territories. 
Moreover, the usage of DDT is to be discussed here. DDT, which is one 
of the most problematic materials developed by human beings, began to 
spread broadly at the end of World War II. DDT used as a pesticide was 
effective not only in killing mosquitos that carry malaria, but also in killing 
a vector of another problematic disease, typhus. As such, the usage of DDT 
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dramatically changed the control of malaria. Hence, anti-malaria activities 
during the military administration will provide some cases that reveal how 
DDT was actually used. 
2.  Station of the U.S. Military and Establishment of Public 
Health System
The U.S. military stationed in South Korea after the end of the Second 
World War ran the military administration before the establishment of 
independent government in Korea. Due to the characteristics of the military 
administration, the maintenance of public order was given first priority, 
while the field of health and medical services received relatively little 
attention. However, the spread of various infectious diseases can cause 
social unrest and the diseases’ prevalence in the field can also become 
contagious to the occupation forces of the U.S. military. Hence, it was 
necessary to build a health and medical services system that focuses on 
prevention of infectious diseases. For this purpose, knowing the current 
situation of the health and medical services in South Korea was a prior task. 
The U.S. military, which was completely ignorant about the South Korean 
situation at the beginning of the stationing, first had to obtain information 
about the situation from local people. In addition to the simple collection 
of information, the help and participation from the locals were essential in 
future ruling. The term “locals” here not only refers to Koreans, but also 
includes Japanese who have been ruling Korea for the past 35 years. From 
a viewpoint of the U.S. military, who had to launch a new government by 
taking over the sovereign of South Korea, assistance from the Japanese 
who have been ruling the peninsula was critical, rather than support from 
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the Koreans who were being governed. In fact, the U.S. military initially 
attempted to make use of Japanese government officials in the military 
administration by leaving the organization of the Japanese Government 
General of Korea, but eventually gave up the plan due to Koreans’ 
fierce resistance. In the field of health and medical services, the military 
government wished that the experienced Japanese doctors, scientists and 
laboratory operators would stay longer to train the Korean workforce for 
future services. However, the Korean sentiment could not allow it.1)
The U.S. military, who could no longer let the experienced Japanese 
government officials participate in the military administration, had to be 
satisfied with the Korean aid. The representative figure in the health and 
medical services sector that became a Korean partner to the U.S. military 
was Lee Yong-sul. Lee Yong-sul was the committee chairman of the Kon 
Kuk Medical Association founded right after the liberation, whose number-
one task was to take over the organization of Japanese doctors and their 
hospitals. The committee also took care of the homecoming war victims 
from overseas. The military government who recognized such activities 
of the Kon Kuk Medical Association asked the association to nominate a 
candidate for sanitation advisor, and Lee who was the committee chairman 
at the time being was recommended. He acted as an advisor at the 
beginning and was named as a chief of the Bureau of Health and Welfare 
under the Military Government Office after its establishment. When the 
Bureau of Public Health and Welfare was raised to the status of Ministry, 
he was named the director of the Ministry of Public Health and Welfare 
on March 29th, 1946. He subsequently became the chief of the Bureau of 
1)  Public Health and Welfare, RG 332, USAFIK, XXIV Corps, G-2, Historical Section, 
USAMGIK, Box No. 20, p. 18-19. 
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Public Health and Welfare of the interim government on February 15th, 
1947 and played a significant role in building the public health system 
until the establishment of the Korean government in August of 1948 (Yeo, 
2012: 11). Even though several Koreans other than Lee Yong-sul such as 
Choi Chai Chang contributed to creating a framework of public health in 
the early phase of the military administration, most used to act as clinical 
doctors right before the liberation and had little experience or professional 
knowledge in public health. Because of this, some of them went to the 
U.S. to study public health supported by the military government (Choi, 
1996: 172).
Building a general framework for public health was important, of course, 
but a problem that required a more urgent response was preventing the 
outbreak of infectious diseases and efficiently handling the already spread 
infectious diseases. The microbiologists Ki Yong-sook and Choi Young-tae 
were chosen by the Military Government Office as experts in preventions of 
infectious diseases. Ki Yong-sook, who used to conduct research on pest 
in Manchuria, was working as a clinical doctor at Daegu Dongsan Hospital 
after returning to Korea by the end of the Japanese colonial period. Choi 
Young-tae was a professor at Severance Hospital. Ki Yong-sook became 
the first director at the Chosŏn (Korea) Institute for Prevention of Infectious 
Diseases, which was established on September 24th, 1945, while Choi 
Young-tae was named as a director of the Bureau of Public Health and 
Welfare (Roh, 1998: 366). Both were the experts of preventing infectious 
diseases and they played active roles during the military administration 
and after the establishment of the Korean government. However, they 
had little opportunity to participate in the public health of the Japanese 
Government General of Korea during the colonial era and hence were 
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unable to provide the U.S. military with valuable information about the 
general disease situation in Korea.
As such, the U.S. military received assistance from the Japanese 
government officials or experts. Even though directly including them in 
the military administration was hard due to strong resistance from Koreans, 
the U.S. military could receive their reports regarding the general disease 
situation in Korea. The military government obtained prior knowledge 
about the disease situation in Korea through in-depth interviews with 
Kobayashi Harujiro (小林晴治郞), a professor at Keijo Imperial University 
and a renowned parasitologist and an authority on endemic research in 
Korea in addition to Japanese army surgeons. Based on the interview 
contents, the following two reports regarding the health situation in Korea 
were published: “Communicable Diseases in Korea” and “Preliminary 
Entomological Report.” A summary of the papers was presented at the 
executive council held on September 15th, 1945.2) The presentation pointed 
out that the overall health situation in Korea became worse nearing the 
end of the war due to the shortage of medicine, food, etc. and that the 
disease-related statistics were incomplete, as they only included the cases 
of hospital visits. The U.S. military decided that the statistics on infectious 
diseases during this period had little credibility after listening to the 
Japanese government officials’ testimony stating that only 10-20% of the 
infectious disease patients were reported.3) In particular, after 1942 toward 
the end of the war, even a cursory report system did not function well, 
further reducing the reliability of the statistics. 
2)  RG 332, USAFIK, XXIV Corps, G-2, Historical Section, Records Regarding the Okinawa 
Campaign, USAMGIX, Box No. 19, Farmer’s Weekly, Jan.-May 1947 thru Miscellaneous 
Notes & Personal Papers Alexander Lane Public Health & Welfare (6 of 7), p. 125.
3) Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan and Korea, No. 2, 1945. 11.
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As the first visible action to build an overall health and medical services 
system in South Korea including prevention of infectious diseases, 
the U.S. military established the Bureau of Public Health and Welfare 
following the military administration decree No.1 that was promulgated on 
September 24th, 1945.4) This was a movement that fundamentally changed 
the previous philosophy and framework of sanitary administration, by 
separating sanitation work that used to be a part of the police work during 
the colonial era and founding an independent organization in charge of it.5) 
This moved the responsibility for public health and quarantines from the 
police to the field of medicine. As a result, medical doctors were appointed 
to be in charge of the public health organization. 
Meanwhile, during this transition, there was resistance from government 
officials who were steeped in old-school thought that public health and 
quarantines are police work. Even though Japanese government officials 
in key positions resigned following the military administration, junior-
rank Korean government officials who worked under them remained and 
carried out the same roles. In this situation, as the military government 
appointed doctors equipped with professional medical knowledge to 
responsible seats in public health in succession, government officials in 
general administration, especially the local administration government 
officials including county chiefs, expressed substantial hostility against the 
appointment of doctors in executive government officials’ position.6)
4)  SCAP, Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan and Korea for September-October 
1945, Section 19, The first director of the Board of Health was Lieutenant Colonel Glenn 
W. McDonald.
5)  Public Health and Welfare, RG 332, USAFIK, XXIV Corps, G-2, Historical Section, 
USAMGIK, Box No. 20, p. 1.
6)  Public Health and Welfare, RG 332, USAFIK, XXIV Corps, G-2, Historical Section, 
USAMGIK, Box No. 20, p. 14. 
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In a context of the active usage of doctors, the reporting system of 
infectious disease outbreak also saw a huge change. During the colonial 
era, sanitary activities were done within a framework of public order 
and hence the main agent of the report was the general police instead of 
doctors. As such, policemen without professional knowledge on diseases 
confirmed and reported diseases, which inevitably reduced the medical 
accuracy of the reported diseases. The reason that the U.S. military could 
not rely on the disease statistics recorded during the colonial era was 
thus not only the high omission rate, but also because the checking and 
reporting of the infectious diseases were done by non-experts. Hence, 
the military government assigned an authority to confirm and report the 
diseases only to the doctors. It also made use of telephones to make the 
reporting more prompt.7)
What the military government took seriously along with the alignment 
of such a system was the manufacturing and securing of vaccines. The 
fact that the Chosŏn (Korea) Institute for Prevention of Infectious Diseases 
was newly established on the same day as the Bureau of Public Health 
and Welfare supports this. The Chosŏn (Korea) Institute for Prevention 
of Infectious Diseases, whose name was changed to the National Institute 
for Prevention of Infectious Diseases on February 19th, 1946, played a 
critical role in the military administration’s sanitary activities. The core 
of the military government’s sanitary activities was the prevention of 
infectious diseases by vaccinations, most of which came from the National 
Institute for Prevention of Infectious Diseases. Vaccinations are surely an 
indispensable part of anti-infection activities, but improvements in citizens’ 
7)  Public Health and Welfare, RG 332, USAFIK, XXIV Corps, G-2, Historical Section, 
USAMGIK, Box No. 20, p. 23. 
YEO In-sok :  U.S. Military Administration’s Malaria Control Activities (1945-1948)
│ 醫史學44
living environment are important as well. However, enhancing people’s 
overall living environment takes time, and the military government might 
have focused on vaccinations that could deliver more direct and visible 
effects. Their stance appears in actual anti-infection activities.
As was suspected, various infectious diseases began to break out after 
the stationing of the U.S. military. On September 11th, 1945, an outbreak of 
13 smallpox patients was reported in Youngdeungpo, Seoul.8) Afterwards, 
smallpox spread nationwide to reach its peak in April of 1946, when the 
reported number of patients reached 19,809.9) The military government 
conjectured that such a broad prevalence despite mandatory smallpox 
vaccinations during the Japanese colonial period was either due to a 
problem with the vaccines or due to the cursory vaccinations. Hence, the 
military government announced a plan to vaccinate every person in South 
Korea and mass-produced vaccines for 18 million people at the National 
Veterinary Laboratory in Busan to distribute nationwide.10) 
In addition to smallpox, cholera spread nationwide in 1946. In May of 
1946, cholera broke out in Busan by a repatriator from China and began to 
spread throughout the country. Upon the outbreak of cholera, the military 
government initiated a vaccination against cholera on the whole nation 
south of the 38th parallel starting in July of 1946. For this, the National 
Institute for Prevention of Infectious Diseases produced 35,868,850 cc 
8)  Public Health Bureau activities for the week ending 10 November 1945. Headquarters 
United States Army Forces in Korea, Office of the Military Governor, Bureau of Public 
Health and Welfare. 
9)  Headquarters United States Army Military Government in Korea(HUSAMGIK), APO 235 
Unit 2. History of the Department of Public Health and Welfare to May 1947. 
10)  Historical Summation, Department of Public Health and Welfare, September 1945 - May 
1947, RG 407, Entry No. 368, Box no. 2066, p. 152. 
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of cholera vaccines during 1946.11) However, this was not enough, and 
another 10,000,000 cc of vaccines was additionally imported from Japan. 
Cholera ceased no sooner than November of 1946, by which time a total of 
15,642 patients were reported and 10,191 died.12)
As such, we cannot say that the military government effectively 
responded to several infectious diseases in the early military administration 
era. However, in a politically chaotic circumstance right after the liberation 
and facing a shortage of available human and material resources, it must 
have been difficult for the military government that was in charge of ruling 
South Korea to instantly build an effective preventing system for infectious 
diseases while launching the military administration at the same time. 
Nevertheless, there was an infectious disease that received a relatively 
effective prevention. It is malaria whose debate comes hereafter.
3. The Pacific War and the U.S. Military’s Malaria Experience
On August 15th, 1945, the U.S. military won the Pacific War following 
Japan’s unconditional surrender and their stationing in Japan began. At 
nearly the same time as Japan’s stationing, the MacArthur Headquarters 
published a 60-page booklet called, “Military Control of Insect and 
Snail Borne Diseases.”13) This booklet is a manual that contains specific 
prevention and management methods of various insect-borne and snail-
11)  中央防役硏究所, 『大韓民國 保健社會部 中央防役硏究所 要覽』第2號, (서울: 大旺印刷所, 
1955), pp. 30-31.
12)  Historical Summation, Department of Public Health and Welfare, September 1945 - May 
1947, RG 407, Entry No. 368, Box no. 2066, p. 153. 
13)  Preventive Medicine Manual for all officers No. 2, Military Control of Insect and Snail 
Borne Diseases, Malaria and Insect-Borne Disease Control, United States Army Forces, 
Pacific, August, 1945.
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borne diseases, e.g., schistosomiasis, which could threaten the health 
of the U.S. military in their new stationing place of Japan. The insect-
borne diseases here mainly refer to diseases that are carried by mosquitos, 
e.g., malaria and encephalitis. The exact publishing date is not clear. It 
only bears a sign “August 1945,” while the preface by MacArthur is dated 
August 20th, 1945. That is, the booklet was published at the same time as 
the stationing in Japan. It is dubious how a booklet with such detailed 
contents could be made in such a short period of time. Of course, it can be 
surmised that the U.S. military prepared in advance, predicting the future 
Japan stationing. However, it can also be conjectured that the publication 
of the booklet in such a short amount of time was possible due to the 
U.S. military’s sufficiently accumulated experience regarding insect-borne 
diseases.
In fact, there are several mosquito-borne severe diseases on the U.S. 
mainland. One of the representative diseases is the well-known yellow 
fever. Malaria was as problematic as yellow fever in America. Malaria 
broke out in southern states such as Mississippi and Missouri, and such 
states had difficulties in securing army forces during the First World War.14) 
Moreover, malaria’s place of origin began to expand in 1935, and the U.S. 
government initiated a serious domestic malaria management project in 
1941.15) The malaria management project involving the extermination of 
the vector insects, mosquitos, in the U.S. was different from the tasks 
that the U.S. military would later perform overseas, both in its contents 
and methods. In other words, the situation surrounding the outbreaks of 
14)  The Medical Department of the United States Army, Preventive Medicine in World War 
II, vol. II. Environmental Hygiene, (Office of the Surgeon General Department of the 
Army, 1955), p. 183.
15) ibid., p. 184.
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the malaria on the battlefield in the Pacific region and the one within the 
U.S. differed, demanding varying responses. Until the adaptation to new 
environment, the U.S. military had to make substantial sacrifices.
The U.S. military that entered the Pacific War faced a huge enemy in 
malaria. The number of U.S. military casualties due to malaria exceeded 
all battle casualties by more than five times in the South Pacific region. In 
the Battle of Bataan that took place in the Philippines in 1942, the malaria 
infection rate in the U.S. military was 85%, resulting in a severe loss of 
fighting power, and as a result, the U.S. military could not help but to hand 
over the Philippines to Japan. Moreover, during the Guadalcanal Battle in 
the Solomon Islands, many soldiers were sent to the rear due to malaria 
and the U.S. military had to struggle waiting for them to recover, suffering 
from a lack of fighting power. The situation was not different in New 
Guinea. It was no exaggeration to say that malaria was an even greater 
enemy than Japan for the U.S. military in the Pacific War. The supply of 
quinine medicine was insufficient and Atabrine was not yet widely used. 
There was no device or medicine that could be conveniently and effectively 
used for mosquito extermination.16) However, the U.S. military, who had 
bitter experiences from malaria, paid a great amount of attention on the 
prevention and management of malaria afterward. As a result, the U.S. 
military could accumulate substantial knowledge on malaria and could be 
equipped with an experienced professional workforce and organization 
that could properly control it by the end of the Pacific War.
There were two types of organizations within the U.S. military that were 
16)  Preventive Medicine Manual for all officers No. 2, Military Control of Insect and Snail 
Borne Diseases, Malaria and Insect-Borne Disease Control, United States Army Forces, 
Pacific, August, 1945. pp. 2-3.
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in charge of malaria, i.e., the Malaria Control Detachments and Malaria 
Survey Units, and their roles were differentiated. First, the primary purpose 
of the Malaria Survey Units was to investigate the current situation. That 
is, it first understood the malaria infection degree through field research, 
accurately defined mosquito species that carry malaria, confirmed outbreak 
spots of mosquitos, and proposed the most efficient management plan based 
on this information. Next, the Malaria Control Detachments conducted 
actual management work following the proposal. As for the basic human 
structure, each Malaria Survey Unit consisted of 14 and each Malaria Control 
Group of 11 individuals. The numbers were not fixed, and the number 
of members changed according to the local circumstances. The Malaria 
Survey Units were aware of mosquitos’ habits, and the members included 
entomologists or parasitology experts with professional knowledge who 
could accurately define the mosquito species. Meanwhile, the Malaria 
Control Groups mainly consisted of sanitary engineering experts who could 
build drains or fill in puddles, with the purpose of restricting mosquitos’ 
outbreaks. Moreover, the Malaria Control Groups were equipped with 
heavy machines such as tractors and bulldozers for these works. In order 
to be a member of these two organizations, applicants had to obtain a total 
of 192 hours of education, 48 hours a week for four weeks. In 1945 right 
before the end of World War II, there were 161 Malaria Control Groups and 
76 Malaria Survey Units currently working. Most of them functioned near 
the Pacific region.17) Hence, when the Pacific War ended, the U.S. military 
was already equipped with accumulated knowledge, human resources, and 
17)  The Medical Department of the United States Army, Preventive Medicine in World War II, 
vol. II. Environmental Hygiene, pp. 206-215. Office of the Surgeon General Department 
of the Army, 1955.
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organizations that could effectively manage malaria, which differed from 
the early stage of the war. Moreover, by the end of the war, DDT, which was 
the strongest pesticide ever, was invented to be used for mosquito control, 
making malaria management easier. The result of these experiences can be 
seen in the prompt writing and publishing of the booklet for the control of 
insect-borne diseases including malaria in parallel with the U.S. military’s 
stationing in Japan, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. Hence, 
the U.S. military who began to be stationed in Japan and Korea right after 
the end of the war could more effectively respond to malaria or other 
insect-borne diseases than any other infectious diseases.
4. Research on the Malaria situation in South Korea
In March of 1946, the U.S. military army surgeon stationed in Japan and 
civilian experts gathered in Tokyo to have a series of meetings, debating 
on how effectively exterminate mosquito during the first summer after 
occupying Japan.18) The focus of the meeting was on how to exterminate 
mosquitos carrying encephalitis, which was regarded as the most threating 
disease to the stationed U.S. military. As the meeting unfolded, a number 
of questions arose, such as where the Japanese mosquitos, including those 
carrying encephalitis, usually propagated, the seasonal variation, and what 
kinds of blood sucking habits they had. Through this, they realized that 
they lacked the knowledge required for effective extermination. Hence, 
the U.S. military conducted extensive research on the types, propagation 
environments, habits, etc. of mosquitos inhabiting every region in Japan 
18)  Mosquito Fauna of Japan and Korea, Office of the Surgeon HQ. 8th Army APO 343. 
Prepared by 207th Malaria Survey Detachment APO 301. p. 1.
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over the following four years and summarized them in a report. The primary 
subject of this survey report was Japanese mosquitos, but the contents 
contain some information regarding mosquitos in Korea.
A task force that directed this survey, the “207th Malaria Survey 
Detachment,” came to Korea in the fall of 1946 and the fall of 1947 to 
conduct an analysis on the mosquitos inhabiting Korea.19) Meanwhile, this 
was not the first time that the U.S. military analyzed mosquitos in Korea. 
On September 8th, 1945, right after the liberation, the “601st Malaria Survey 
Detachment” came from Japan to Seoul via Incheon. Entering Seoul, they 
collected mosquitos from diverse regions of mosquito outbreaks and 
determined species starting on September 10th for the purpose of obtaining 
information about the mosquitos inhabiting Korea.20) These survey results 
were summarized in the previously mentioned report. According to 
this report, there were a total of 23 mosquito species inhabiting Korea 
including “Anopheles sinensis,” which is a representative mosquito that 
carries malaria. All except for three were commonly observed in Japan.21)
Conducting surveys on the vector insects, mosquitos, was the most 
fundamental task for understanding the malaria situation in South Korea. 
Actually, understanding how many malaria patients exist at the moment 
or how many there were in the past was important as well. The primary 
reference was the malaria-related statistics recorded during the colonial 
19) ibid., p. 54.
20)  Unit History, 601st Malaria Survey Detachment, RG 332, USAFIK, XXIV Corps, G-2, 
Historical Section, Records Regarding the Okinawa Campaign, USAMGIX, Box No. 19, 
Farmer’s Weekly, Jan.-May 1947 thru Miscellaneous Notes & Personal Papers Alexander 
Lane Public Health & Welfare (6 of 7). p. 77.
21)  Mosquito Fauna of Japan and Korea, Office of the Surgeon HQ. 8th Army APO 343. 
Prepared by 207th Malaria Survey Detachment APO 301. p. 55. The species Anopheles 
pillus, Aedes chemulpoensis, Aedes seoulensis were reported to be found only in Korea.
YEO In-sok : U.S. Military Administration’s Malaria Control Activities (1945-1948)
제24권 제1호(통권 제49호) 35-65, 2015년 4월 │51
era. However, this also had low credibility, like other disease statistics for 
the same reason as mentioned before. Moreover, malaria was not even a 
legal infectious disease during the colonial era and hence the statistics were 
rarely accurate. Nevertheless, the U.S. military could not help but refer to 
these incomplete statistics. They grasped the Korean malaria situation using 
the Japanese survey data during the colonial era. The statistics referred by 
the U.S. military were from 1935. The U.S. military quoted a report that 
argued that even though the malaria outbreak in Korea is mostly tertian 
malaria, there are some falciparum malaria cases resulting from infection 
via needles in the case of drug addicts.22)
In order to complement the previously incomplete statistics, consultations 
with experts were also underway. The military government listened to the 
report on the overall malaria situation and characteristics in Korea from 
Kobayashi Harujiro who was a professor at Keijo Imperial University and 
a renowned parasitologist. His explanation is summarized next. In Korea, 
malaria was especially prevalent in southern areas, and there were few 
fatal cases, as the symptoms were not so severe. Moreover, vector insects 
were mainly “Anopheles hyrcanus sinensis,” which usually propagated 
in rice paddies or puddled. The characteristics of the malaria outbreak 
in Korea were that it peaked in June and July right before August when 
the number of mosquitos soared. Professor Kobayashi surmised that the 
malaria outbreak would continue until the late summer through the latent 
period, similar to other regions.23) Even though the military learned about 
22)  TB MED 208, War Department Technical Bulletin, Medical and Sanitary Data on Korea, 
p. 36, Dec 1945.
23)  RG 332, USAFIK, XXIV Corps, G-2, Historical Section, Records Regarding the Okinawa 
Campaign, USAMGIX, Box No. 19, Farmer’s Weekly, Jan.-May 1947 thru Miscellaneous 
Notes & Personal Papers Alexander Lane Public Health & Welfare (6 of 7), p. 126.
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the general characteristics of the malaria outbreak in Korea reported by 
Professor Kobayashi, they could not obtain accurate statistics. However, 
they could secure incidence statistics for troops, which were relatively 
accurate compared to the civilians’ incidence statistics that were largely 
incomplete. According to statistics by the Japanese army, the number of 
malaria patients in the Japanese army over the course of eight months in 
1945 until the Japanese surrender in August was 1,647.24) 
The military government, who understood the malaria situation in South 
Korea to a certain extent through previous statistics and expert interviews, 
initiated a direct survey on civilians’ malaria infection rate. On September 
19th, the previously mentioned “601 Malaria Survey Detachment” conducted 
blood tests on about 500 elementary school students in Seoul as a sample 
for malaria protozoan confirmation along with examinations of mosquitos. 
It subsequently conducted identical tests on elementary school students in 
other regions such as Songdo and Iri. According to the results, plasmodium 
vivax was confirmed in approximately 4% of the children with a minor 
difference between each school (Table 1).25) 
24)  General Condition of Health and Welfare, 13 December 1945, Headquarters XXIV Corps 
Office of the Surgeon APO 235. RG 332, USAFIK, XXIV Corps, G-2, Historical Section, 
Records Regarding the Okinawa Campaign, USAMGIX, Box No. 19, Farmer’s Weekly, 
Jan.-May 1947 thru Miscellaneous Notes & Personal Papers Alexander Lane Public Health 
& Welfare (6 of 7). p. 128.
25)  Essential Technical Medical Data, 15 December 1945. Headquarters XXIV Corps Office 
of the Surgeon APO 235, RG 332, USAFIK, XXIV Corps, G-2, Historical Section, Records 
Regarding the Okinawa Campaign, USAMGIX, Box No. 19, Farmer’s Weekly, Jan.-
May 1947 thru Miscellaneous Notes & Personal Papers Alexander Lane Public Health & 
Welfare (6 of 7). p. 114.
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Table	1.	Result	of	Blood	Smear	Test	for	Primary	School	Students	in	Seoul
Name of School
No. of Children 
Examined
No. of Positive Percent
Songdo 99 2 2.0
Sobbingo 80 1 1.3
Hallnam 75 3 4.0
Hyoje-dong 72 1 1.3
Tschung-ke 75 1 1.3
Mapodong 75 3 4.0
Sogdong 75 6 8.0
(USAFIK, 1945: 114)
It was not easy to conduct a nationwide survey that confirms infection 
through direct blood smear and hence there are no accurate statistics 
regarding this. Nevertheless, the authorities presumed that approximately 
20% of the residents in southern rural areas were infected with malaria and 
that approximately one million patients experienced an outbreak nationwide 
each year (Chu, 1951: 92). Statistical data partially exist in Jeollabuk-do, 
Chungcheongnam-do, and Gyeongsangbuk-do, and Gyeongsangbuk-do 
had a significantly higher incidence compared to other regions. Because of 
this, Gyeongsangbuk-do was under special management when the malaria 
eradication project supported by the WHO began in the late 1950s. 
Table	2.	Reported	Malaria	Cases	in	1947	and	1948
Provinces 1947 1948 Total
Jeollabuk-do 22,526 2,400 24,926
Chungcheongnam-do 22,490 - 22,490
Gyeongsangbuk-do - 68,214 68,214
Above three provinces 45,016 70,614 115,630
Other provinces 4,169 450
Total 94,201 141,678 235,879
(Chu, 1951: 92)
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As shown above, the military government seems to have had substantial 
interest in malaria control and attempted management from the early 
stationing in South Korea. This can be quite surprising considering the 
fact that the malaria that broke out in South Korea was not as fatal as the 
outbreak that the U.S. military experienced in the South Sea Islands. It was 
much milder. The reason malaria was not designated as a legal infectious 
disease during the colonial era despite large number of malaria outbreaks 
is surmised to be the mild nature of Korean malaria. Nevertheless, even 
though Korean malaria was not as fatal as other infectious diseases, malaria 
was the most common disease for the U.S. military stationed in Korea. 
Actually, in terms of the nationwide prevalence of other infectious diseases 
such as cholera and typhus, there were few cases in the U.S. military. 
On the contrary, there was an endless stream of malaria patients within 
the troops throughout the summer even though a series of actions were 
taken, including DDT spray and mosquito repellent incense (Chu, 1952: 3). 
Moreover, although tertian malaria is not fatal, it substantially diminishes 
infected individuals’ activity. In case of high malaria infection rate, the 
overall activity level of the group will dwindle, and hence the disease 
should never be overlooked. In that sense, malaria was a particularly 
important disease from an economic point of view. In Korea, which was 
an agricultural nation at the time, malaria patient outbreaks were focused 
on the busy season for farmers, i.e., from June to August. The labor loss 
due to malaria was serious, and it reduced agricultural productivity. Hence, 
malaria was a significant disease not only from the viewpoint of civilians’ 
public health, but also from an economic perspective (Choi, 1949: 37).
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5. DDT and Malaria Control 
Malaria control is conducted in two ways. The first is by administering 
medicine to infected individuals, and the second is by controlling vector 
insects, i.e., mosquitos. Even though controlling mosquitos is the more 
fundamental measure, it is nearly impossible to thoroughly prevent 
mosquito outbreaks due to mosquitos’ broad range of origin locales. 
Hence, it has been common to focus on medicinal administrations. Actually, 
malaria management during the colonial era was also confined to quinine 
administrations to patients. The necessity for mosquito control was surely 
broached at the time, but mosquito control remained a mere principle due 
to its practical difficulty (Yeo, 2011: 72). 
The development of DDT as a pesticide fundamentally changed the 
pessimism on mosquito control. Although DDT was initially synthesized in 
1874, its effectiveness as a pesticide was found no sooner than 1939. DDT 
came into the spotlight as its effects on controlling mosquitos that carry 
malaria, which was most problematic during the Second World War, and 
on others lice that carry typhus fever were confirmed (Kinkela, 2011: 20). 
DDT possesses strong insecticidal effects and long residual effects while 
having been believed harmless to the human body or environment, all of 
which made DDT a miracle pesticide. 
The spray of DDT can be largely divided into two ways. The first is 
to dust powder, which is usually used for the control of lice and fleas 
that carry typhus fever. The powder is directly perfused on clothing or 
blankets that vector insects mainly inhabit or on a person’s hair or inside 
the sleeves, collars, underwear, etc. Sometimes it is perfused inside pants 
by loosening the belt. A 5% DDT solution made by diluting DDT powder 
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in diesel oil or paraffin can also be sprayed. This is a method commonly 
used for controlling mosquitos and flies, and it is used to control vermin 
in houses where people reside or inside buildings. Spray is done on every 
inside surface where mosquitos or fly can sit, including walls, ceilings, 
chairs, tables, closets, etc. This maximizes the advantage of DDT, i.e., long 
residual effects, and the effects last for about three months after spray as 
long as it is not intentionally washed out.26)
Even though it is unknown exactly when DDT was first used in Korea, it 
is conjectured to be right after the U.S. military’s stationing in South Korea. 
DDT spray was not regularly done. According to the rule, a temporary 
spray team consisting of approximately 20 people was organized right 
before the spray season to perform tasks and was dismissed afterward. 
Considering the nature of the work, spray teams were mainly composed 
of malaria control and survey detachments. In the case of South Korea, the 
“179th Malaria Control Detachment” was in charge of mixing and supplying 
various pesticides in the field. Moreover, these people mainly organized a 
temporary spray team and they disinfected buildings in downtown Seoul 
that were once occupied by the Japanese so that people could use them. It 
is likely that DDT was first used by these people in South Korea.27) 
On September 26th, 1945, DDT solution was sprayed from the sky in 
Seoul for the first time.28) This was done to prevent the outbreak of diseases 
26)  Preventive Medicine Manual for all officers No. 2, Military Control of Insect and Snail 
Borne Diseases, Malaria and Insect-Borne Disease Control, United States Army Forces, 
Pacific, August, 1945. pp. 56-59.
27)  RG 332, USAFIK, XXIV Corps, G-2, Historical Section, Records Regarding the Okinawa 
Campaign, USAMGIX, Box No. 19, Farmer’s Weekly, Jan.-May 1947 thru Miscellaneous 
Notes & Personal Papers Alexander Lane Public Health & Welfare (6 of 7). p. 77.
28)  Public Health and Welfare, RG 332, USAFIK, XXIV Corps, G-2, Historical Section, 
Records Regarding the Okinawa Campaign, USAMGIX, Box No. 19, Farmer’s Weekly, 
Jan.-May 1947 thru Miscellaneous Notes & Personal Papers Alexander Lane Public Health 
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that are carried by flies and mosquitos. Starting from November, DDT 
residual spray was done once a month on trains, buses, trams, jails, school, 
factories, etc.29) DDT spray was performed in refugee camps and clinics 
every other month. Since the repatriators from the North were highly likely 
to possess carriers of typhus fever, Seoul where they gathered, deserved 
special attention. Therefore, vaccination, along with DDT dusting, was 
performed on residents in seven regions that were thought to have an 
especially high risk.30) 
DDT spray was concentrated in urban areas such as Seoul, especially 
the residential area of the U.S. military. This was primarily done to prevent 
a mosquito outbreak in the U.S. military’s stationing regions, but broader 
regions surrounding the troops also required spray, as malaria could not be 
prevented only by managing the barracks due to the mobility of mosquitos. 
Hence, paraffin, diesel oil, etc. were perfused along with DDT in the U.S. 
military’s stationing regions or cities in order to extensively get rid of 
mosquitos.31) The extermination of mosquitos through DDT spray where 
the U.S. military was stationed was led by the U.S. military, but other cities 
needed Koreans to play such a role. In addition, an educational program 
was also underway encouraging people to avoid mosquito outbreaks inside 
their homes and to be careful not to be bitten by mosquitos during a night 
out. Examining how the malaria control program unfolded by looking 
at the Chungcheongbuk-do case, a task force sprayed DDT and paraffin 
& Welfare (4 of 7). p. 153.  
29)  Medical History (1 October 1945 to 31 December 1945), Headquarters XXIV Corps Office 
of the Surgeon, APO 235. p. 100. .
30)  Headquarters United States Army Forces in Korea, Office of the Military Governor, Bureau 
of Public Health and Welfare, Public Health Bureau Activities for the Week ending 10 
November 1945. USAMGIK Box 19, p. 80.
31) USAMGK, part III, p. 89.
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all over downtown once a month, disinfected the insides of houses, and 
ran the educational program that encourages people to be careful not 
to be bitten by mosquito at night.32) DDT was distributed to pharmacies 
throughout Korea to be sold33) and even to households for free.34) From 
time to time disinfection activities ran into trouble depending on the DDT 
supply situation. In the summer of 1948, the DDT supply shortage was so 
severe that the malaria management project in Seoul and Gyeongsangbuk-
do almost stopped.35)
Although the National Chemical Laboratory in Seoul succeeded in 
manufacturing DDT by February 1946,36) most of the DDT used in Korea 
depended on imports.37) Japan also used to import the final product of 
DDT to begin with. Since DDT has an active component of 10%, Japan 
imported condensed DDT and used it after mixing it with 90% talc. In May 
of 1946, DDT production was approved in Japan, and independent DDT 
production became possible in Japan (Sams, 1998: 85).  
Although DDT was effective, it was not easy to control mosquitos. For 
example, the malaria infection rate was very high in southern rural areas, at 
approximately 20% and hence required more active mosquito control work 
than any other region. There are many rice paddies in southern rural areas, 
and mosquitos usually propagate in stagnant water such as rice paddies. 
Hence, DDT should have been sprayed in rice paddies for mosquito 
control. However, direct DDT spray on rice paddies was not an option, 
32) Public Health and Welfare, USAMGIK Box 20, p. 223..
33) Dongailbo, 1 February, 1947.
34) Dongailbo, 4 June, 1947.
35)  USAMGIK, APO 235 Unit 2, Monthly Report of Public Health and Welfare Activities for 
July, 1948. p. 1.
36) Dongailbo, 26 February 1946.
37) Kyunghyangshinmun, 24 April, 1947.
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as DDT spraying kills rice.38) Hence, there was not much to do in terms of 
mosquito control in rural areas where the actual infection rate was high.
The problem was not confined to DDT spray. Mosquito control was more 
effectively done through collaboration with the engineering battalion.39) As 
stagnant water is a common place for mosquito propagation, it was possible 
to get rid of such mosquito propagation spots by making gutters to drain 
the water or filling puddles themselves. However, it was hard to expect 
this kind of direct action from the engineering battalion in Korea. Although 
a shortage of hands was the primary reason, a more serious problem was 
that randomly draining water from or filling in rice paddies regarded as the 
mosquito propagation origin was nearly impossible in Korea. 
In fact, although the U.S. military suffered as a result of the malaria 
outbreak in the early phase of the Pacific War, it became able to 
systematically respond to malaria as experience and knowledge 
accumulated along with DDT development. This fact is clearly reflected in 
the manual published by MacArthur Headquarters right after the end of the 
war for controlling insect-borne diseases including malaria, as previously 
mentioned. However, when closely looking at the contents of the manual, 
there are several parts that are not applicable to the South Korean situation, 
as the manual was written based on experiences on the battlefields in the 
South Sea islands. For example, extensive DDT spray using airplanes was 
38)  Interview: Bureau of Public Health Chung Chong Namdo, Capt. William H. Townsend, 
17 Apr 46. RG 332, USAFIK, XXIV Corps, G-2, Historical Section, Records Regarding 
the Okinawa Campaign, USAMGIX, Box No. 19, Farmer’s Weekly, Jan.-May 1947 thru 
Miscellaneous Notes & Personal Papers Alexander Lane Public Health & Welfare (6 of 
7). p. 22. 
39)  The Medical Department of the United States Army, Preventive Medicine in World War 
II, vol. II. Environmental Hygiene, p. 202. Office of the Surgeon General Department of 
the Army, 1955.
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possible and engineering battalions could fill in the puddles of mosquito 
outbreaks using heavy machinery in the islands. However, it was not easy 
to directly apply such methods to South Korea. Hence, the anti-malaria 
activities through mosquito control were inevitably limited to some extent.
6. Conclusion
The anti-malaria activities led by the U.S. military government come 
to an end with the termination of military administration. Then, can we 
judge the anti-malaria activities during the military administration to be 
successful? It is hard to give a definite answer. Most of all, the decision 
on whether something is a success or a failure, differs depending on the 
criteria for success. Nevertheless, an indirect answer can be made by 
showing the changes from the previous period, i.e., the colonial period. 
First of all, the greatest change was the direct extermination activity on 
malaria’s vector insect, i.e., the mosquito. As mentioned before, this 
was thanks to the development of the strong pesticide DDT. The malaria 
control during the colonial era relied on posterior measures such as quinine 
doses for prevention or treatment, rather than vector insect control, which 
can fundamentally prevent a disease outbreak. However, following the 
emergence of DDT, a transition toward a more fundamental direction of 
vector insect control became possible. One thing to point out is that DDT’s 
potential damage to the human body or the environment was not seriously 
considered since there was little recognition of the side effects of DDT 
at the time. Moreover, the establishment of a more prompt and accurate 
report system about outbreak patients and of reliable disease statistics were 
improved compared to the past. Meanwhile, these improvements were not 
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just confined to malaria, but involved the overall disease report systems.
Of course, there were several limitations. For example, as the activity was 
mainly focused on cities and regions where the U.S. Army resided, regions 
with more severe malaria sometimes received little prevention support. 
Anti-malaria activities were conducted during the Korean War, and a 
nationwide malaria eradication project followed, which was supported by 
the WHO in the late 1950s. In particular, the malaria eradication project was 
the first large-scale project supported by the WHO, and it proves the fact 
that malaria was given first priority in public health at the time. Hence, the 
military administration’s anti-malaria activities are significant, in that they 
provided a starting point for anti-malaria projects conducted afterwards. 
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U.S.MilitaryAdministration’sMalaria
ControlActivities(1945-1948)*
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Medicine, Yonsei University, Seoul, KOREA
To prevent and control infectious diseases was one of the major concerns 
of U.S. military government when they stationed in Korea in 1945. It was 
because the spread of various infectious diseases can cause social unrest 
and they can also affect the U.S. military. Malaria was one of the most 
important infectious diseases to which the U.S. military had been paying 
special attention. The U.S. military received a severe damage during the 
Pacific war with Japan due to malaria. It was said that more soldiers were 
lost by malaria than by battle itself. The bitter experience they had during 
the war made them accumulate more systematic and practical knowledge 
against malaria. As a result, by the end of the war, the U.S. military could 
run more than hundreds of units specialized in controlling malaria. Thanks 
to such a preparation, they could immediately begin their anti-malaria 
activities in Korea soon after the World War II. Although the vivax malaria, 
which is the dominant type in Korea, is not as much a fatal type as that 
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in the Pacific areas, it was damaging enough to the infected. The 207th 
Malaria Survey Detachment carried out collecting and identifying the kinds 
of mosquitos in Korea. In addition, they also surveyed the prevalence of 
malaria among school children in Seoul. In terms of controlling malaria, 
DDT played a decisive role. Vector control is the most effective and ideal 
measurements against malaria. Before the development of DDT, it was 
practically impossible to eradicate mosquitos which arise from extremely 
broad areas. However, DDT could not be used as it had been expected 
in the rural area, because spraying DDT in the rice paddies which is 
the breeding place of mosquitos kills rice. Despite such a limitation in 
anti-malaria activities of the US military government, it should be noted 
that a significant turn in controlling malaria was possible thanks to the 
development of DDT. 
Keywords:  anti-malaria activities, malaria, DDT, mosquito, vector 
control, U.S. military government     
